Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election. OSW Commentary No. 89, 2012-07-12 by Iwanski, Tadeusz
1ce
s
 
c
O
M
M
e
N
T
A
R
y
 
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
 
c
e
s
 
c
O
M
M
e
N
T
A
R
y
 
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
s
t
e
r
n
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
 
c
e
s
 
c
O
M
M
e
N
T
A
R
y
Commentaryosw
i s s u e  8 9  |  1 2 . 0 9 . 2 0 1 2  |  C e n t r e  f o r  e a s t e r n  s t u d i e s
OSW.WAW.PL
1	 The	figures	cited	
in	the	article	come	
mainly	from	the	most	
reliable	Ukrainian	
public	opinion	
research	companies:	
the	Razumkov	Centre	
and	the	Kiev	Interna-
tional	Institute	
of	Sociology.	Their	
websites,	however,	
do	not	provide	figures	
that	would	enable	
a	long-term	analysis	
of	the	mood	of	the	
Ukrainian	people	
regarding	all	the	
areas	covered	in	this	
commentary	(e.g.	the	
mood	of	protest	or	the	
level	of	trust	in	the	
opposition).	What	is	
more,	the	reliability	of	
the	data	available	is	
compromised	by	
a	relatively	high	rate	
of	refusal	to	take	part	
in	the	polls	(probably	
around	30%),	which	
negatively	affects	
their	representative-
ness.	It	should	also	
be	stressed	that	the	
refusal	rate	is	rarely	
reported	by	the	re-
search	companies.
2	 See:	http://www.
razumkov.org.ua/ukr/
news.php?news_
id=386.	The	rate	
at	which	the	public	
mood	has	been	
darkening	is	higher	
than	during	the	presi-
dency	of	both	Leonid	
Kuchma	and	Viktor	
Yushchenko.
Public feeling in Ukraine ahead of the parliamentary election
Tadeusz Iwański 
After two and a half years under President Viktor Yanukovych and the 
Party of Regions, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians are dissatisfied 
with the state the country’s economy is currently in and the direction it has 
been developing in. There has also been a significant drop in stability and 
social security with the general public increasingly feeling that the govern-
ment has little interest in their problems. Only 16% of Ukrainians believe 
that the current government has performed better than their predecessors, 
although overall confidence in both the ruling party and the opposition re-
mains low. Nonetheless, falling support for the president and the Cabinet 
does not seem to have translated into greater popularity for the country’s 
opposition parties; these currently enjoy the confidence of only a quarter 
of the electorate. The clear lack of credibility for politicians on either side 
of the political spectrum, coupled with an almost universal preoccupa-
tion with the bare necessities of life, has shifted the political processes 
in Ukraine further down the agenda for the majority of Ukrainians.
Ukraine’s poor economic performance, which over the last two years has 
been addressed through a series of highly unpopular economic reforms, 
has resulted in a growing mood of discontent and increased civil activity, 
with the Ukrainian people reporting a greater willingness than ever to join 
protests on social issues. Most of them, however, have shown much less 
interest in political rallies. This is likely to stem from low levels of trust in 
the opposition and the general belief that opposition politicians are not 
a viable alternative to the current government. One may therefore assu-
me that there will be little public scrutiny of the parliamentary election 
scheduled for 28 October, and that the likelihood of mass demonstrations 
during it is low. However, in the event of large-scale vote rigging and a di-
smissive response from the government, spontaneous unsanctioned rallies 
cannot be ruled out. What is more likely, however, is a series of protests 
after the elections, when the already difficult economic situation is further 
exacerbated by a predicted rise in the price of gas for Ukrainian households 
and a possible move to devalue the Ukrainian hryvnia.
Opinion	 polls1	 in	Ukraine	 suggest	 that	 over	 the	 last	 two	 years	 the	 general	mood	 of	 the	
Ukrainian	people	has	soured	(see	Appendix	1).	Only	6%	of	respondents	believe	that	the	situ-
ation	in	the	country	has	improved,	with	66%	reporting	a	change	for	the	worse2.	The	negative	
trend	has	continued	throughout	2012.	Currently,	75%	of	the	Ukrainian	people	believe	that	
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Ukrainian society has little confidence 
in the state, in its main institutions 
and in its politicians. The negative 
assessment of their work has not, 
however, improved how Ukrainians 
view the opposition.
the	country’s	economy	is	performing	badly	(with	only	2%	claiming	the	opposite),	and	just	
16%	of	those	polled	expect	the	situation	to	improve	over	the	next	12	months3.	Moreover,	
only	28%	of	respondents	believe	that	the	Ukrainian	government	is	implementing	reforms,	
and	within	that	group,	just	1%	are	of	the	opinion	that	the	reforms	have	been	successful.	
One	of	the	main	reasons	for	the	harsh	assessment	of	the	recent	changes	in	the	country	is	
the	deteriorating	state	of	the	Ukrainian	economy.	Higher	food	and	utility	costs	have	been	
cited	as	a	major	concern	by	over	half	of	Ukrainians.	Securing	economic	means	for	survival	
has	therefore	become	the	main	focus	of	Ukrainian	society4.	The	top	14	places	on	the	list	of	
issues	that	the	Ukrainian	people	expect	their	politicians	to	address	most	urgently	are	taken	
up	by	problems	related	to	their	financial	situation5;	in	comparison,	only	19%	of	them	are	
concerned	about	the	campaign	of	repression	launched	by	the	government	against	the	oppo-
sition6.	Consequently,	issues	such	as	the	establishment	of	a	dictatorship	in	the	country,	the	
loss	of	national	sovereignty,	and	limits	put	on	freedom	of	speech,	are	important	to	only	10%	
of	Ukrainians7.	This,	in	turn,	means	that	Ukrainian	society	as	a	whole	is	less	interested	in	
closely	monitoring	the	work	of	the	government,	which	gives	it	more	leeway	in	implementing	
changes	in	areas	which	do	not	directly	affect	the	economic	situation	of	the	Ukrainian	people,	
including	a	possible	shift	in	foreign	policy.	
Ukrainian society vs. political class
Ukrainian	society	has	little	confidence	in	the	state,	in	its	main	institutions	and	in	its	politi-
cians,	regardless	of	their	political	affiliations.	None	of	the	key	state	institutions,	with	the	ex-
ception	of	the	army,	is	trusted	by	more	than	22%	of	the	Ukrainian	people8	(see	Appendix	2).	
Although	 President	 Viktor	 Yanukovych	 enjoys	 the	 highest	 public	 confidence	 levels	 from	
among	 all	 politicians	 in	 the	 ruling	 camp,	
only	 22%	 of	 respondents	 say	 they	 trust	
the	president,	while	as	many	as	66%	do	
not	trust	him.	Yanukovych	performs	badly	
even	in	the	east	of	the	country,	where	both	
he	and	his	Party	of	Regions	have	tradition-
ally	 enjoyed	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 public	
confidence	 (only	 30%	 of	 respondents	 in	
eastern	Ukraine	trust	the	president,	while	
as	many	as	57%	do	not).	Public	support	
for	the	decisions	taken	by	Yanukovych	during	his	presidency	has	also	been	waning.	Back	
in	April	2010	–	two	months	after	Yanukovych	took	office	–	37%	of	Ukrainians	supported	
his	policies;	by	December	2011	this	figure	had	dropped	to	just	8%.	A	similar	drop	over	the	
same	period	was	observed	in	the	public’s	support	for	both	the	government	and	parliament	
(see	Appendix	3).
Over	 the	 last	12	months,	 the	 level	of	Ukrainian	society’s	political	alienation	has	also	 in-
creased9.	As	many	as	82%	of	Ukrainians	believe	that	they	have	no	real	influence	over	what	
happens	in	the	country,	while	over	half	of	the	respondents	are	uninterested	in	or	irritated	
by	the	work	of	the	government	and	the	president.	The	polls	also	show	that	only	5%	of	re-
spondents	respect	those	in	power,	and	as	little	as	3%	are	positively	disposed	towards	the	
members	of	the	ruling	camp.	Furthermore,	the	number	of	people	who	consider	themselves	
to	be	happy	has	dropped	for	the	first	time	in	10	years	and	for	the	first	time	under	the	rule	
of	Viktor	Yanukovych;	the	figure	currently	stands	at	53%	(down	from	63%	a	year	ago)10.	
The	negative	assessment	of	the	work	of	the	ruling	party	has	not,	however,	improved	how	
Ukrainians	 view	 the	opposition.	Also	 this	 side	of	 the	political	 spectrum	has	been	 suffer-
ing	from	low	levels	of	public	trust,	although	their	 figures	are	slightly	better	than	those	of	
3	 See:	Iryna	Kyrychenko,	
Задовольнятися чи бути 
задоволеним, Дзеркало 
Тижня. Україна №20,	
01.06.2012	http://dt.ua/SO-
CIETY/zadovolnyatisya__chi_
buti_zadovolenimi-103105.
html
4	 See:	Iryna	Kyrychenko,	
Маленький українець: довіра, 
побоювання, пріоритети, 
Дзеркало Тижня. Україна,	
№12,	30.03.2012	http://
dt.ua/SOCIETY/malenkiy_
ukrayinets__dovira,_poboyu-
vannya,_prioriteti-99690.html
5	 See:	data	published	by	the	Ra-
zumkov	Centre	in	June	2012,	
http://dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2012-
year/vybory_parlament_reytyn-
gy_2_2012.htm.	The	data	are	
particularly	spectacular	since	
the	respondents	were	allowed	
to	choose	as	many	
as	10	different	answers.
6	 Ibid.
7	 See:	Iryna	Kyrychenko, 
Маленький українець...	
op. cit.
8	 See:	research	by	the	Kyiv	
International	Institute	of	So-
ciology	from	February	2012.	
http://kiis.com.ua/ua/news/
view-152.html
9	 See:	http://www.gfk.ua/pub-
lic_relations/press/press_ar-
ticles/009771/index.ua.html	
for	figures	on	the	people’s	
rejection	of	government	(April	
2012,	GfK	Ukraine).
10	 See,	for	example,	http://kiis.
com.ua/ua/news/view-149.
html
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the	president	and	the	government.	Polls	suggest	that	24%	of	the	electorate	trusts	the	op-
position	(while	53%	do	not),	with	somewhat	better	figures	coming	from	western	Ukraine	
(a	difference	of	5%).	The	overall	support	for	opposition	leaders	has	been	growing,	although	
the	change	has	been	quite	slow11.	Public	support	 for	Yulia	Tymoshenko,	 for	example,	 in-
creased	between	April	2010	and	December	2011	from	14%	to	15%	(while	support	for	one	
of	the	key	opposition	figures	Arseny	Yatsenyuk	rose	from	11%	to	13%	in	the	same	period).	
The	high	level	of	distrust	of	Ukrainian	politicians	can	be	clearly	seen	from	a	survey	which	
suggests	 that	Ukrainians	are	more	 likely	 to	 trust	a	 complete	 stranger	 than	a	politician12.	
Meanwhile,	Ukrainian	society	is	most	willing	to	trust	institutions	not	linked	to	the	govern-
ment,	and	those	that	have	no	direct	influence	over	the	economic	situation	in	the	country.	
These	include:	the	Ukrainian	Orthodox	Church	and	the	media.	These	institutions	are	also	
the	only	ones	that	more	people	trust	(62%	and	40%,	respectively)	then	distrust	(17%	and	
28%,	respectively).	
This	attitude	to	the	Ukrainian	political	class	means	that	the	majority	of	the	Ukrainian	peo-
ple	believe	that	the	upcoming	parliamentary	elections	will	not	improve	the	situation	in	the	
country.	This	can	be	seen	from	the	high	number	of	respondents	who	remain	undecided	as	
to	who	to	support	(27%)13.
The	growing	 lack	of	 financial	 security	 and	 the	 rejection	of	 the	political	 class	 in	Ukraine,	
have	led	to	a	situation	where	issues	not	directly	related	to	the	improvement	of	living	stand-
ards	 are	 beginning	 to	 be	 of	 little	 concern	 to	most	 voters.	 This	 attitude	 to	public	 affairs,	
however,	 stems	 not	 only	 from	 Ukraine’s	
economic	 hardship.	 The	 large-scale	 apa-
thy	affecting	Ukrainian	society	 is	a	result	
of	 the	 general	 disappointment	 with	 the	
country’s	 political	 class	 over	 the	 last	 20	
years,	and	 in	particular	 the	 failure	of	 the	
2005-2009	‘Orange’	government.	Broken	
election	 promises,	 the	 political	 chaos	 of	
Yulia	Tymoshenko’s	premiership	and	per-
manent	 conflict	 with	 President	 Viktor	
Yushchenko,	as	well	as	the	subsequent	defections	of	a	number	of	the	Orange	Revolution	
leaders	to	Viktor	Yanukovych’s	camp14	have	resulted	in	a	lack	of	interest	in	politics	among	
the	Ukrainian	people,	who	have	come	to	believe	that	politicians	universally	lack	credibility	
and	take	decisions	aimed	at	improving	their	own	position.	The	current	government,	mean-
while,	has	not	only	failed	to	restore	public	confidence	in	the	political	class,	but	has	gradu-
ally	made	matters	worse.	The	growing	hesitance	among	Ukrainian	voters	to	take	interest	
in	 those	 government	policies	which	do	not	 affect	 them	personally	but	which	are	 linked,	
for	example,	to	issues	of	democracy	or	the	modernisation	of	the	state	raises	doubts	about	
Ukrainian	society’s	desire	to	actively	monitor	the	autumn	elections.	
Potential for protest
2011	saw	2,277	demonstrations15	of	various	kinds	in	Ukraine	–	showing	only	a	slight	drop	
from	the	2,305	rallies	organised	in	2010.	In	both	years,	most	of	the	protests	(60%)	ad-
dressed	socio-economic	issues,	and	the	majority	of	them	were	attended	by	fewer	than	100	
people.	None	of	them	could	be	defined	as	mass	rallies,	with	the	largest	of	them	attracting	
a	crowd	of	just	12,000	people	(see	Appendix	4).	Political	protests	accounted	for	25%	of	all	
rallies;	many	of	them	were	organised	in	response	to	Yulia	Tymoshenko’s	trial,	and	showed	
anger	at	 central	 government.	The	 figures	 show	 that	only	1	 in	20	protests	was	attended	
by	more	than	1,000	people	(down	from	1	in	12	in	2010).	What	is	more,	the	number	of	
11	 See,	for	example,	http://www.
razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.
php?news_id=386
12	See:	Iryna	Kyrychenko, 
Маленький українець...		
op. cit..
13	See:	http://www.kiis.com.ua/
ua/news/view-173.html
14	 Incl.	Vladislav	Kaskiv,	
the	head	of	Ukraine’s	State	
Agency	for	Investment	and	
National	Projects,	who	
in	2004	chaired	Ukraine’s	
Pora	movement	(It’s	Time)	
and	later	helped	lead	the	
‘Orange	Maidan’	in	Kiev.	Also	
Petro	Poroshenko,	currently	
Ukraine’s	Minister	for	Trade	
and	Economic	Development,	
who	previously	served	as	the	
country’s	Foreign	Minister
15	See:	Centre	for	Society	Re-
search	report,	http://www.ce-
dos.org.ua/protestmonitor/33-
reports/118-e-zvit-2011-pub-
lished
The large-scale apathy affecting 
Ukrainian society is a result of the gen-
eral disappointment with the country’s 
political class over the last 20 years, 
and in particular, the failure of the 
2005-2009 ‘Orange’ government. 
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demonstrations	organised	to	protest	against	both	political	and	social	issues	was	low.	This	
was	related	to	the	 fact	 that	political	 rallies	 in	Ukraine	rarely	call	 for	social	change,	while	
demonstrations	focusing	on	the	welfare	of	the	general	public	seldom	raise	political	slogans	
(with	 just	13%	of	events	making	combined	demands).	 In	addition,	 the	 lack	of	mixing	of	
agendas	 stems	 from	 the	 general	 dislike	which	 protesters	 have	 for	 opposition	 politicians.	
Consequently,	the	organisation	of	joint	rallies	or	allowing	politicians	to	participate	in	welfare	
protests	could	potentially	compromise	the	cause	in	the	eyes	of	both	the	rest	of	society	and	
the	government,	who	the	demands	are	addressed	to.	
It	 therefore	 follows	that	 the	 likelihood	of	achieving	a	cumulative	effect,	which	could	 lead	
to	 large-scale	 protests	 across	Ukraine,	 remains	 low.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 largest	 ral-
lies	calling	on	 the	president	and	the	government	 to	give	up	power	were	not	attended	by	
politicians	and	were	aimed	at	addressing	mainly	social	and	economic	issues.	Once	under	
way,	however,	these	demonstrations	became	more	radicalised	and	began	to	make	political	
demands	as	well.	This	was	true	of	the	best-known	protests	held	in	Ukraine	over	the	past	
2	years;	all	of	them	organised	by	particular	social	groups	in	response	to	individual	projects	
proposed	by	the	government.	The	largest	of	them	was	the	so-called	‘tax	maidan’,	held	in	the	
autumn	of	2010,	when	over	10,000	local	
entrepreneurs	protested	against	the	provi-
sions	of	a	new	tax	code.	The	following	year	
the	biggest	rallies	were	organised	in	March	
by	teachers	and	local	workers	–	with	the	
former	calling	for	higher	wages	and	better	
welfare	support,	and	the	latter	demanding	
changes	to	the	new	labour	code.	In	the	au-
tumn	of	2011,	veterans	of	the	Afghan	War	took	to	the	streets	to	voice	their	anger	at	a	bill	that	
proposed	to	strip	them	of	their	welfare	benefits.	Their	protests	culminated	in	September,	
with	10,000	people	gathering	outside	the	Verkhovna	Rada	in	Kiev.	During	the	same	period,	
Ukraine	saw	a	number	of	protests	organised	by	Chernobyl	victims,	who	opposed	restrictions	
on	their	welfare	benefits.	All	of	the	rallies	were	formed	by	groups	of	ordinary	citizens,	repre-
sented	by	trusted	NGOs,	and	all	of	them	had	real	leaders	and	a	clear	objective.	Meanwhile,	
political	rallies	organised	by	the	opposition	focused	on	short-lived	calls	for	a	change	of	power	
and	failed	to	attract	much	public	support.	
In	 the	 first	 6	 months	 of	 2012,	 Ukraine	 saw	 only	 a	 few	 demonstrations,	 organised	 on	
a	local	level,	and	most	of	them	were	a	continuation	of	last	year’s	initiatives.	This	relative	
state	of	calm	could	be	a	 result	of	pre-election	promises	made	by	 the	government	at	 the	
beginning	of	the	year	and	which	has	been	actively	promoted	in	the	Ukrainian	media	ever	
since.	These	include	the	launch	of	social	welfare	programmes	worth	16-25	billion	hryvnia	
(2-3	billion	USD),	cheap	mortgages,	and	a	plan	to	pay	1,000	hryvnia	in	compensation	to	
anyone	who	put	down	a	deposit	on	a	flat	during	Soviet	times	and	did	not	receive	accommo-
dation.	The	number	of	political	protests	in	the	same	period,	particularly	between	May	and	
July,	increased.	These	rallies	were	organised	mainly	by	Yulia	Tymoshenko’s	party	colleagues	
but	failed	to	attract	much	interest	from	the	public.	The	first	week	of	July,	meanwhile,	saw	
a	record	number	of	demonstrations,	caused	predominantly	by	the	passing	of	a	controversial	
Language	Bill	by	the	Ukrainian	parliament,	which	paved	the	way	for	the	Russian-speaking	
minority	 to	have	their	 language	recognised	as	an	official	 language	alongside	Ukrainian	 in	
most	of	the	country’s	regions.	The	presence	of	opposition	politicians	at	these	rallies	suggest-
ed	they	intended	to	politicise	the	protests.	The	generally	low	turnout	at	the	demonstrations	
(most	of	them	were	attended	by	no	more	than	100	people)	showed	both	the	reluctance	of	
Ukrainian	people	to	attend	demonstrations	with	opposition	politicians,	as	well	as	the	general	
belief	that	the	Bill	was	largely	harmless16.
16	65%	of	Ukrainian	people	
welcome	the	decision	to	
raise	the	official	status	of	the	
Russian	language,	http://kiis.
com.ua/ua/news/view-179.
html.	Meanwhile,	the	same	
number	of	respondents	believe	
that	the	passing	of	the	bill	
was	an	element	of	the	ongoing	
election	campaign	http://www.
razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.
php?news_id=400.	
Political rallies organised 
by the opposition and focused 
on short-lived calls for a change 
of power failed to attract much 
interest from the public. 
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Outlook for the future
On	the	eve	of	the	election	campaign,	there	is	significant	potential	for	protests	to	break	out	in	
Ukraine.	Just	as	in	2004,	the	overwhelming	majority	of	Ukrainians	believe	that	the	current	
situation	in	the	country	is	bad	and	that	measures	taken	by	the	government	have	been	insuf-
ficient.	More	people	are	also	stating	that	they	are	ready	to	take	to	the	streets	to	fight	for	their	
rights,	with	those	who	wish	to	maintain	social	peace	at	all	costs	now	becoming	a	minority.	
It	should	be	stressed,	however,	that	for	a	number	of	reasons	the	likelihood	of	large-scale	po-
litical	protests	across	Ukraine	is	rather	low.	First,	parliamentary	elections	are	far	less	likely	to	
spark	protests	than	a	presidential	ballot.	Second,	currently	only	30%	of	respondents	believe	
that	the	upcoming	elections	will	changes	things	for	the	better17.	This	stems	mainly	from	the	
general	disillusionment	of	Ukrainian	people	with	politics.	What	can	be	currently	observed	
in	Ukraine	is	a	strengthening	of	‘passive	solidarity’,	whereby	people	are	willing	to	support	
protests	verbally	but	are	unlikely	to	actively	participate	in	demonstrations.	It	appears	that	the	
majority	of	Ukrainians	no	longer	believe	that	protests	are	an	effective	instrument	of	change.	
Third,	large-scale	rallies	are	unlikely	due	to	low	support	for	the	opposition	and	its	key	politi-
cians,	coupled	with	the	lack	of	a	strong	leader	–	a	figure	similar	to	Viktor	Yushchenko	before	
the	 Orange	 Revolution.	 This	 means	 that	
the	Ukrainian	opposition	is	not	only	unable	
to	 take	advantage	of	 the	drop	 in	support	
for	the	ruling	party	but	is	also	incapable	of	
channelling	the	growing	discontent	of	the	
Ukrainian	people	towards	the	achievement	
of	their	own	objectives.	In	effect,	opposi-
tion	politicians	are	not	perceived	as	effec-
tive,	credible	leaders	who	have	a	clear	vi-
sion	for	the	country	and	who	are	capable	
of	devising	a	means	by	which	to	achieve	it.	
Their	failure	to	produce	a	clear	manifesto	
with	a	transparent	programme	of	economic	reform	leading	to	concrete	changes	rules	them	
out	as	a	credible	political	alternative	to	the	ruling	camp.	The	vague	demands	made	by	the	
opposition	are	simply	not	enough	to	mobilise	Ukrainian	society	against	the	current	govern-
ment.	Meanwhile,	the	tactics	that	are	likely	to	be	used	by	the	government	in	the	upcoming	
election	campaign	will	focus	on	welfare	and	community	initiatives.	They	will	also	avoid	tak-
ing	any	decisions	that	could	worsen	the	financial	situation	of	voters	and	thus	spark	mass	
protests.	The	likelihood	of	such	demonstrations	immediately	after	the	elections	is	also	low,	
although	this	could	change	if	the	government	is	found	to	have	indulged	in	vote	rigging.	In	
that	 case,	 protests	 could	become	uncontrollable,	 as	 the	 opposition	would	be	unlikely	 to	
capitalise	on	them.	At	the	same	time,	the	already	strained	relations	between	Kiev	and	the	
West,	and	the	series	of	actions	taken	by	the	Ukrainian	government	to	address	these	con-
cerns	(e.g.	the	decision	to	include	the	opposition	in	the	re-drafting	of	the	electoral	law,	and	
the	invitation	of	foreign	election	observers	to	the	country)	may	suggest	that	serious	violations	
of	the	election	process	are	unlikely.	The	situation	may	change,	however,	after	the	elections.	
It	is	expected	that	in	order	to	balance	the	budget	and	improve	the	state	of	public	finances,	
the	government	will	take	a	series	of	measures	whose	results	will	bear	a	direct	impact	on	the	
people	of	Ukraine.	Among	the	most	likely	changes	is	a	rise	in	the	price	of	gas	for	Ukrain-
ian	households	(this	is	also	one	of	the	key	conditions	set	by	the	IMF	for	the	resumption	of	
negotiations	on	a	stabilisation	loan)	as	well	as	the	devaluation	of	the	Ukrainian	hryvnia.	This	
could,	of	course,	lead	to	mass	protests,	particularly	if	these	changes	have	a	negative	impact	
on	the	Ukrainian	economy.
17	 See	results	of	a	poll	conducted	
by	the	Razumkov	Centre	in	
April	2012,	http://dif.org.ua/
ua/polls/2012-year/chern-
oveckii-kupil-maibah.htm
At the moment, the business plan 
is based on preliminary estimates 
and has no concrete financial evi-
dence. Meanwhile, the continuing 
integration of energy markets across 
the European Union is forcing 
potential investors to make sound 
financial choices. 
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1. Is the situation in Ukraine developing in the right direction? (%)
AppeNd i x 
2. Do you trust the following institutions?
Yes (%) No (%)
The Church 62 17
The media 40 28
NGOs 27 29
The army 34 37
The opposition 24 53
The president 22 66
The police 15 63
The government 16 69
Parliament 12 73
Source:  Razumkov Centre (December 2011), http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.php?news_id=386
Based on data from the Kiev-based Razumkov Centre (December 2011), http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/news.php?news_id=386
* A	rise	in	positive	responses	is	lkely	to	be	linked	to	the	government’s	pre-election	welfare	initiatives.
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3. Do you support the actions of the following politicians? (%)
AppeNd i x 
4. Main themes of protests held in 2011 
Theme (%)
Socio-economic 60
Ideological (e.g. history, national identity) 25
Political 25
Civil rights 17
Source: Centre for Society Research Report, http://www.cedos.org.ua/protestmonitor/33-reports/118-e-zvit-2011-published
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